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More than thirty years ago, Richard Rorty published Consequences of Pragmatism. 
There, and in other writings, Rorty challenged the centrality and even the necessity 
of “experience”, a notion that had played such an important role in the work 
of pragmatists such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Rorty 
denigrated “experience” as both unnecessary and retrograde, and criticized Dewey 
and James for either lapsing into bad faith (offering experience as a substitute for 
“substance”, or “mind”, etc.) or for simply lacking the linguistic tools (devised later 
by analytic philosophy) to escape philosophical dead ends. He pronounced that 
experience could and should be eliminated to from pragmatism. 
Rorty’s critique of the classical figures, along with his championing of figures 
he affiliated with pragmatism (such as W. V. O.  Quine, W. Sellars, and D. Davidson) 
created both space and motivation for the development of more language-centered 
pragmatisms, sometimes collected as “neopragmatism” or “new pragmatism” or 
“linguistic pragmatism”. These language-centered strategies have become important 
in the work of figures such as Robert Brandom, Huw Price, Michael Williams, and 
Bjørn Ramberg. As summarized by Alan Malachowski, the advantage of the “new 
pragmatism” was that it “has not bound itself by the sorts of commitments that were 
always going to hold classic pragmatism back. Of these, empiricism, with the accent 
on experience, is the principal factor. New Pragmatists are able to discard much 
philosophical baggage by shifting its focus to language” (Malachowski 2010: 31).
Still, philosophy never just develops along one track, and neither did pragmatism. 
For while Rorty sought to eliminate experience from pragmatism, contemporaries of 
Rorty (e.g., John J. McDermott and Richard Bernstein) were elucidating the notion 
and arguing for its indispensability to pragmatism. In a recent book (2010) Bernstein 
argued, contra Rorty, that a pragmatic conception of inquiry requires experience: 
“Redescription, no matter how imaginative, is not enough” (Bernstein 2010: 214, 
italics in original). Bernstein traces this lesson to Peirce’s view that “experience 
involves bruteness, constraint, ‘over-and-againstness’. Experience is our great 
teacher. And experience takes place by a series of surprises” (Bernstein 2010: 132). 
Without this element, Bernstein maintains, experimental inquiries lack friction. This 
experience-centered approach was and continues to be influential for another group 
of contemporary pragmatists such as Mark Johnson, Thomas Alexander, Richard 
Shusterman, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Gregory Pappas, Douglas Anderson, and 
many others. (I would place myself in this group.)
The depth and continuity of these developments show, I believe, that we have come 
to a point where what were originally just different emphases in pragmatism now 
constitute different schools or, if you like, “isms”. For if there is any stable meaning to 
the term “neopragmatism” (or its congeners such as “linguistic pragmatism”), it exists 
because of those pragmatists who have made language (and linguistic analysis) central 
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to what pragmatism is and, more importantly, what it should do. And because there 
is a prescriptive element here – what pragmatism should do – there is a concomitant 
need to spell out the differences between the pragmatisms and to explicitly raise the 
question “What difference does it make if pragmatism is centered on language or 
experience”? This issue seeks answers to that question.
State of the question
While many in philosophy recognize the tension between pragmatisms that 
emphasize “language” or “experience”, many wonder whether this is a false question; 
they suspect that these concepts can, indeed must, coexist in some way. One motive for 
pressing the question, then, is revealed by pressing the further question: How should 
language and experience relate? Should we say, perhaps, that “All experience must be 
expressible in language”? Or should we say, instead, that “All language takes place 
within a broader field of experience”? We could phrase the questions differently, but 
my point is that the same type of initial choice points will recur; picking an emphasis 
is harder to evade than it might initially seem.
If you do not agree, here is another motive for investigating the choice that is more 
straightforward: the dismissal, tout court, of experience by the linguistic pragmatisms 
of Rorty, Brandom, and others following their linguistic leads. As various authors 
remind us in this issue, the explicit use – and even mention – of “experience” is 
viewed by some linguistic pragmatists as un- or even counter-productive to the 
methods and aims of pragmatism, and so experience should be banned. As readers 
will discover, this move to winnow pragmatism down is arguably much more than 
a technical adjustment; rather, it represents a fundamental, even radical, change in 
what pragmatism can and should do. (In contrast, classical pragmatism never sought 
to dismiss language.) Because, then, the newer pragmatism seeks a narrower (they’d 
argue better) focus, the question becomes one of the costs. This question is, I think, a 
sufficient reason to investigate language-vs.-experience as a dilemma.
The goal of this issue is to (a) have authors evaluate the dilemma as they see   it, 
since the way a philosophical question is posed can make a huge difference; (b) 
present any answer they offer; and, finally, to (c) explore possible alternatives or, 
if they argue that the question is ill-formed, to provide convincing dismissals of the 
whole premise. The remainder of this introduction briefly limns a few of the issue’s 
themes and more striking assertions. By necessity, the introduction is selective; 
I urge readers to give close and careful study to all the pieces in this volume. By my 
lights, they are all excellent. I am most grateful to all the contributors for their diligent 
scholarship and their patience as this volume came together.
Defining Linguistic Pragmatism
Despite the fact that the salient themes and ideas have been on the scene for more 
than thirty years, consensus about the definition of linguistic or neopragmatism is 
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still hard to find. (I made one focused attempt in Hildebrand 2012.) It is gratifying, 
then, to see a variety of authors adding their efforts here. Mark Johnson, for example, 
locates the root idea of linguistic pragmatism in Rorty’s key claim (in Consequences 
of Pragmatism) that “when it comes to matters of meaning, understanding, and 
knowing, there is nothing beneath or beyond language against which our linguistic 
articulations might be measured or evaluated. Rorty doesn’t make the ridiculous claim 
that there is nothing beyond language, but only that our practices of communicating, 
assessing truth-claims, and coordinating action are linguistically structured, through 
and through”. Rorty’s idea, Johnson continues, is further developed by Brandom, who 
expresses it both in his depiction of the “linguistic turn” and his own “lingualism”. 
As Brandom puts it, the former is a process of “putting language at the center of 
philosophical concerns and understanding philosophical problems to begin with 
in terms of the language one uses in formulating them” while the latter is the 
“commitment to understanding conceptual capacities (discursiveness in general) in 
terms of linguistic capacities” (Brandom 2011: 22). And while there is plenty that 
Brandom admires in the classical pragmatists, he minces few words as to how he 
parts company with them. “What one misses most in the pragmatists – at any rate 
separates them from us – is that they do not…share the distinctively twentieth-century 
philosophical concern with language, and with the discontinuities with nature that 
it establishes and enforces” (Brandom 2004: 15). Such views, Johnson comments, 
amount to “an analytic philosophical perspective enriched with a pragmatist attention 
to action [where]...the ‘actions’ are principally linguistic acts” and so, in sum, we get 
the following definition: 
Linguistic pragmatism is what you get when you start with analytic philosophy’s 
founding assumption that language is our access to any meaning we are capable of 
experiencing and then supplement this with the pragmatist insight that meaning is a 
mode of action tied to values and forms of communicative interaction.
Thomas Alexander agrees, and emphasizes the retrograde element in these 
(ostensible) “advances” in pragmatism. For Alexander, the narrowed approach taken by 
linguistic pragmatism constitutes a return to long-held habits in philosophy. Focusing 
mainly on Brandom, Alexander writes that “linguistic pragmatism...confines its vision 
of human existence to theories of linguistic meaning, where language is thought of 
as largely concerned with epistemological issues”. Some other definitional efforts in 
this issue are fine grained; John Capps, for example, distinguishes between Rorty and 
what he calls a “second wave” of linguistic/neopragmatism rooted in Rorty but also 
divergent. Capps’ focus is Huw Price’s “global anti-representationalism/expressivism/
inferentialism” which, he argues, takes linguistic pragmatist “anti-representationalism 
to its logical extreme”.
The Rejection of Experience and The Rejection of That Rejection
Understandably, part of defining a philosophy that aims to supersede another, 
earlier one, returns, ineluctably, to how the newer should displace the older. Here, 
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the crux of the matter is the rejection of experience by linguistic pragmatism. To be a 
“linguistic pragmatist” is, in part, hermeneutic, a commitment to interpreting (major 
portions of) classical pragmatism as justifying “knowledge or truth claims by reference 
to some allegedly non- or pre-linguistic ‘experience’ that supposedly provides the 
ultimate constraints on what counts as knowledge” (Johnson). This accusation (made 
against the classical pragmatists but against others, too) is sometimes referred to as 
“givenism” and critics ground it in Wilfrid Sellars’ attack on the “Myth of the Given”. 
Regarding this issue, James O’Shea and Colin Koopman express some sympathy 
with neopragmatist criticisms of experience as committing the sin of “givenism”. 
Koopman, for example, invokes as legitimate “Brandom’s concern that Dewey 
frequently invokes a concept [experience] that he forces to play the double-role that 
Sellars criticized [...]. [Such givenism] is for Brandom (following Rorty, following 
Sellars) rightly a sin insofar as it cannot but help extending an invitation to empiricist 
foundationalism [...]. We can rightly attribute this double-role to Dewey’s concept of 
felt qualitative immediacy”.
O’Shea notices a similar, problematic tension in James’ view of pragmatic meaning, 
especially that between the (a) relational and “leading” aspect of meanings and their 
(b) felt, qualitative aspect. As O’Shea puts it, “The tensions arise when the ‘effects’ 
that are taken to be entailed by applications of and inferences involving the given 
concept begin to take the form of various introspected qualities or felt experiences that 
cannot plausibly be regarded as playing the cognitive semantic roles for which they are 
unfortunately volunteered by James”. This tension, O’Shea notes with some approval, 
“is taken by Rorty and Brandom to disappear if we follow Sellars’s thoroughgoing 
rejection of ‘the given’ as a myth; that is, if we eschew any appeals to ‘experience’ 
where this is portrayed as both non-discursive in nature and yet somehow by itself, 
without conceptual presuppositions, intrinsically reason-giving or reality revealing 
(the myths of the ‘epistemic given’ or ‘categorial given’ respectively)”. 
The upshot, then – for those who suspect classical pragmatism of violating Sellars’ 
prohibition of givenism – is to force upon “experience” one of two construals. As 
Johnson puts it, “Experience, on this view, is either already a linguistic construct, or 
else it has no standing in selecting out which concepts, truth claims, and modes of 
knowing are sanctioned by communities of inquirers”. Such a dilemma demands a 
response from experience’s defenders, and they come with both force and speed.
Defensive and Expansive Accounts of Experience
Some authors offer a direct defense of experiential pragmatism (against the 
charge of “givenism”), while others offer an indirect defense – typically by offering 
an account of experience (frequently Dewey’s) exculpating it from such charges. 
Johnson, for example, attributes the erroneous nature of the givenism charges to 
linguistic pragmatism’s inadequate accounts of language, meaning, and experience 
itself (especially as informed by recent brain psychology). Linguistic approaches, 
he complains, assume that “all thought is linguaform–linguistically expressible as 
a set of concepts, propositions, and their relations”. He goes on to give evidence 
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why this is wrong. Alexander’s piece notes this same tendency in Brandom: “In 
spite of the ‘pragmatic’ turn in placing emphasis on belief as action, it still has tacit 
propositional content that can be linguistically explicated. I think this is still a version 
of the assumption that all experience is about knowing”. The correction, then, is to 
realize that “the key insight is that not all experience is experience-as-known and that 
knowing experience arises and terminates within experience that is not knowing”. To 
Alexander, it is important not only to correct the misreading of Dewey, but to make 
clear that those who follow Dewey’s lead are not being obstinate. 
One of the major issues that divides “us” (experiential pragmatists or cultural 
naturalists) from “them” (linguistic pragmatists) is that “they” think we are holding on 
to some archaic piece of epistemology when we have dropped epistemology altogether 
and the “intellectualist” view of experience that comes with it and embraced instead an 
existentially embedded view of cultural existence that turns toward life, the lived body, 
culture and history. 
Cheryl Misak’s piece also criticizes Rorty and Brandom for narrowing pragmatism’s 
wider compass: “Much of the damage Rorty has done to pragmatism comes from 
setting up a false choice between language or experience [...]. An important insight at 
the very heart of pragmatism is that language and experience cannot be pulled apart”. 
She continues by noting that “James and Dewey...thought that philosophy was not all 
about language – it was about language and experience”.
Still other defenses (for retaining “experience”) proceed, at least in part, by 
discrediting those laying siege. Margolis, for example, attributes Rorty’s criticism 
of Deweyan experience (and his suggestion to abandon it in favor of “discourse”) to 
a “deep misunderstanding of Dewey’s pragmatism” stemming from his “failure to 
engage Dewey’s account [in the Logic] of ‘experience’”. Rorty’s readings of Dewey 
neglect, either intentionally or unintentionally, Dewey’s reconstruction of experience 
as well as his philosophy’s account of “the precision of logic and science [as] itself 
no more than approximative and informal, being instrumental finally to the transient 
goals of the same inquiry that invites their subaltern precision” (Margolis). The result, 
Margolis argues, is that Rorty’s advice is “irresponsible”, “never really grounded 
pertinently”, “completely wide of the mark”, and “incoherent on its face”. The upshot 
is stark: “Neither Davidson nor Rorty can be rightly supposed to extend or improve 
Deweyan pragmatism”.
In addition to defending experience from (perceived) misreadings or reductions by 
linguistic pragmatists, there are a variety of positive explorations of what experience 
means. Some (such as Alexander, Margolis, Pappas, and others) emphasize the 
existential starting point. “The main idea”, Alexander writes, is that the matrix of 
inquiry, the lifeworld, is largely noncognitive”. Given that, he adds, experience in 
Dewey “takes on a plurivocity with a variety of ‘as-structures’; these cannot all be 
reduced to the univocity of ‘as-known’”. In his reading, experience is akin to “culture” 
in an anthropological sense, “the structured practices and symbol systems by which 
human beings exist together as communities in the world”. Roberta Dreon’s essay 
also makes this point. In the course of correcting the mistaken “water pipe metaphor” 
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of communication – a deformation of Dewey’s famous remark about language as the 
“tool of tools” – Dreon argues that once we discard bad metaphors and come to see 
language as a form of action, we can come to see that “action...is structurally shared or 
participatory, in the sense that in order to be accomplished it needs many individuals’ 
contributions. This is why communication is so important for the human species, 
because according to Dewey it literally means the ‘making of something common’”.
Margolis also situates experience in this larger cultural and existential framework; 
he characterizes Dewey’s use of “experience” as “heuristic (or mythic) attempts to 
recover the profoundly conjectural, passing, constructivist nature of what we should 
mean by cognition and reflexive understanding”. Such attempts must evade the 
analytic exactitudes (of approaches such as Brandom’s) as they are “broadly self-
regulative in a respect that cannot be independently ‘denoted’ by the instrumental 
powers of logic and science”. 
Interestingly, for Jörg Volbers, what is worth celebrating about pragmatist 
reconstructions of experience is the way they enable other reconstructions of logic 
and science. Pragmatists provide, Volbers says, an “experientially driven reflection 
on the model of the experiment”. This reflection accomplishes the further (and most) 
important objective: it diversifies the antifoundationalist advance begun (but not 
adequately sustained) by Kant. As Volbers puts it,
the problem with much of post-analytic philosophy of language, as well as with certain 
readings of classical pragmatism, is a too narrow understanding of antifoundationalism. 
It is restricted to an idealized (and yet always implicitly scientifically biased) account of 
understanding and meaning. A wider conception should rather use science’s success as 
an opportunity to articulate the different forms of contact with experience[...]. Classical 
pragmatism establishes such a wider perspective... [because] instead of dropping the 
empiricist’s reference to experience, it consciously reconstructs it.
Thus, experimental practice consists of “experiences [that] are never isolated 
‘given’ cognitions, but rather form a dynamic flow with both obstacles and reinforcing 
effects [and this] experiential flow is perceived in relation to the experimentalist’s 
expectations and conceptions, giving it significance beyond the immediate moment”. 
Via pragmatism, reconstructions of science and experience reinforce one another 
(and address practical human problems), while nevertheless remaining immune to 
Sellarsian charges of “givenism”.
The Inseparability of Language and Experience, and the Larger Stakes for 
Pragmatism
Most authors here argue for the inseparability of language and experience. Their 
reasons vary, of course, but their consensus about this basic point strikes a powerful 
contrast to the confident claims (by, for example, Rorty and Brandom) that experience 
can be dismissed. Such a dismissal, they argue, would seriously damage a range of 
core pragmatist ambitions; to name just a few: antifoundationalism (Volbers), more 
scientifically sophisticated understandings of language and meaning (Johnson, Dreon), 
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the creation of socio-cultural (and personal) meaning (Alexander), ethical and political 
engagement (Misak), and innovative understandings of human selves (Margolis).
To conclude, I shall return to the initial issue of the motive and import of the 
question itself (regarding whether language or experience is central to pragmatism). 
Do the authors here see this question as bearing on larger stakes for philosophy and 
pragmatism? The answer is that some do not, some do, and some do not register a view 
about this. 
Two authors, Volbers and Koopman, argue explicitly against the importance of the 
choice itself (between “language” and “experience”). As Volbers puts it, “the conflict 
between ‘language and experience’ appears to be of limited value. The more important 
subject...is how to keep the delicate balance between what will turn out to be the two 
constitutive orientations of antifoundationalism: a general affirmation of science, on 
the one hand, and an insistence on the standing possibility of critical reflection. Here 
it emerges that it is ‘reflexivity’ which forms the core of modern antifoundationalism”. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Volbers maintains that “the classical pragmatists’ 
strong notion of ‘experience’ is of great value for such an articulation of critical 
reflexivity”. Koopman’s strategy (against the choice between “language” and 
“experience”) is to promote what he imagines is a third option that is more important 
but overlooked: “conduct”. “Conduct”, he claims, is a more dynamic and processual 
notion than either “language” or “experience” and so is better able to engage what he 
says is central to pragmatism, its temporality and historicity: “Conduct is pre-eminently 
a doing rather than a thing done [...]. Though prior pragmatisms may have worked 
toward accounts of language and experience as dynamic in character, it is undeniable 
that thinking and feeling admit of static treatment in a way that conduct simply does not. 
A doing is something that moves, while meaning has for us almost entirely lost its 
verbal sense, and experiencing is already an awkward construct in contrast to an 
experience”. The virtues possessed by “conduct” (but not by either “language” or 
“experience”) ultimately matter to Koopman because they more effectively facilitate 
pragmatism’s traditional normative and melioristic aims.
For others, the question is meaningful and the stakes are high. “It turns out”, Johnson 
writes, “that this issue is not just a minor in-house skirmish over who gets to be the ‘true’ 
pragmatist. Rather, it is a matter of what philosophy ought to be and to do, if it hopes 
to make any significant positive difference in our lives”. Alexander concurs, arguing 
“the debate between linguistic and experiential pragmatism reflects a fundamental 
philosophical conflict – a conflict about the purpose of philosophy and its conception 
of human existence” (Alexander). He warns that the adoption of linguistic pragmatism 
comes “at the cost of all that is contained in Dewey’s concept of experience. And with 
that goes, I believe, most of what makes us human”. Margolis’ larger philosophical 
aim is to understand our humanity by grasping what he calls “the artifactuality of 
the human person (the hybrid, biologically and culturally ramified emergence of the 
human person)” and so for him it is important to raise the language/experience question 
in order to show that “for many reasons, there cannot be any effective priority between 
the existentialia of human feelings and those of our reflexive conception of the human 
condition itself!”. For Misak, the stakes are clearly normative. Concerned by how the 
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narrowness of some Wittgenstein-inspired pragmatisms engender moral quietism, one 
value to her of answering the question (regarding the relative importance of language 
vs. experience) is to establish a more appropriate (more engaged, more moral) balance. 
As she puts it, 
Once [pragmatists like Rorty and Brandom] have so thoroughly contextualized meaning 
and truth, it seems that there is nothing we can say about how to evaluate this or that 
claim to meaning and truth...But the worry is: if it’s all a matter of language, then 
how can we adjudicate between inconsistent views?...[T]his quietism is dangerous and 
makes no sense at all of our practices.
Clearly, the debate will continue. 
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